Précis
In the second half of the twentieth century, civil wars eclipsed inter–state war as the "far greater scourge" in terms of death toll, duration, and occurrence and with it, a host of new conflict puzzles emerged. One puzzling feature is that many states seem to defy normative, political, or strategic incentives and choose costly, heavy–handed, counterinsurgency methods, producing high levels of violence and civilian casualties. Recent work finds that only 11% of 20th century counterinsurgency campaigns sought to protect civilians, and even incumbents that provided the model for Western counterinsurgency doctrine regularly departed from strategies of minimal force. A separate but related puzzle is the seemingly casual, haphazard, and limited manner with which states go about fighting rebellion, evidenced by the high number of civil conflicts left as "draws" or with enduring "low–activity," particularly in Asia. While outcomes are generally murky, states will often persist with costly, unsuccessful strategies. Why then do states choose brutal or minimalist strategies to fight rebellion despite persistent or repeated failure? Understanding the strategic logic of these incumbents in civil war—like when they escalate and when they under react—is essential for policymakers to anticipate states' destabilizing strategies, stem spillovers, and restructure incentives to mitigate violence. Copyright 2014, Précis