The Open Technology Institute at the New America Foundation joined Public Knowledge, Common Cause, and the Institute for Local Self-Reliance in submitting comments to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the Commission's rules on Licensing Models and Technical Requirements in the 3550-3650 MHz Band. Read full text of comments here [pdf]
The undersigned members of the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition (hereinafter “PISC”), applaud the Commission for its innovative and balanced proposal to unlock the tremendous potential of unused spectrum in the 3.5 GHz band. A Citizen’s Broadband Radio Service (“CBRS”) based on the dynamic three-tier access framework recommended by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) is potentially a landmark in the Commission’s progress away from static “command and control” licensing rules and toward more flexible and spectrum-efficient approaches that harness the full potential of the nation’s spectrum resource. We applaud the Commission’s effort to convert this grossly underutilized spectrum into an intensively-used, small-cell band in a manner that not only protects military and other incumbent systems from interference, but also builds a foundation for more extensive private sector sharing of underutilized bands with an automated governing mechanism (a “Spectrum Access System”).
The comments of most parties continue to reflect a broad consensus in favor of a unified band plan implementing the three-tier framework and Spectrum Access System (“SAS”) proposed by the Commission in the FNPRM. The record also demonstrates strong support among a diverse range of industry commenters for the Commission’s proposal to reserve for General Authorized Access (“GAA”) use a minimum 50 percent of the available spectrum in every license area nationwide and to authorize the SAS to coordinate opportunistic access to unused Priority Access (“PA”) spectrum capacity across the entire 3550-3700 MHz band. A “use it or share it” policy is the closest thing to a spectrum efficiency “free lunch.” The default position for the SAS should be to assign the unused portion of a census tract to the pool of available GAA spectrum on a temporary basis.
PISC strongly opposes the two-tier “Transitional Framework” that Verizon and AT&T propose as an alternative to rapid implementation of the Commission’s proposed three-tier framework. Verizon’s proposed “Transitional Framework” has no credible rationale and is clearly designed to ensure that GAA use of the band either never happens, or is isolated in a separate “unlicensed” segment of the band, using devices that Verizon previously argued should be prohibited from being interoperable with Priority Access devices or from operating even on unassigned PA spectrum.
Sadly, the comments filed by Verizon, AT&T and their associated equipment and chip vendors (Qualcomm, et al.) remain remarkably consistent with the last 25 years of filing on wireless technologies. Since the dawn of the wireless age, Ma Bell (and, subsequently, the Baby Bells) have fought the evolution of innovative and competitive wireless technologies. In the 1980s, the wireline incumbents insisted that the FCC should limit the number of initial cellular licenses to two, with one in every market going to the incumbent to 'ensure' development of the new technology by giving it to the expert incumbent phone company. At every evolution in the wireless market – from the decision to implement auctions in 1994 to the decision to create the TV white spaces in 2008 – the incumbent cellular interests have consistently made the same argument: trust the incumbent providers and their business model rather than 'risky' new technologies or 'unproven' new entrants.
In this proceeding the incumbent interests have taken their protectionist policy arguments to new heights of absurdity. Rather than continue the straightforward technical evolution of spectrum sharing technologies as identified by the Commission, PCAST, Internet companies and leading independent technical experts, AT&T and Verizon urge the Commission to delay the implementation of dynamic small cell sharing and instead adopt an untried approach whose sole 'virtue' is that it would undermine the evolution of spectrum sharing technologies and the growth of competitors incumbents fear would disrupt their current business models.
If the last 25 years of wireless policy have taught us anything, it is that the arguments of incumbents provide an impeccable compass for the Commission as it seeks to chart a path to innovation. Whatever the incumbents urge, do the opposite. Where the FCC has listened to the incumbent chorus demanding set asides and privileges to 'ensure' the 'productive use and development' of spectrum – such as when the FCC adopted the AT&T proposal to create a wireless duopoly and award one free license to every wireline incumbent – innovation and competition have suffered. When the FCC has ignored these pleas for special treatment – such as when the FCC rejected the demands of virtually the same set of commenters to license and auction the TV white spaces – the American people have reaped the rich rewards that come from new technologies and new entrants.
History also tells us that the incumbents themselves will benefit from the technologies they resist today. As PK, OTI and others predicted when defending expansion of shared spectrum technologies over the last 12 years, users of licensed spectrum have become active users and multi-billion dollar beneficiaries of the unlicensed spectrum technologies they once sought to undermine and cripple, but which now substitute for expensive carrier infrastructure that would otherwise be needed to carry surging data traffic. Now these very same companies and trade associations try to undermine and cripple deployment of the next generation of small cell, shared spectrum technology in the 3.5 GHz band. The Commission should reject their transparent attempt to thwart the forward-looking efficiencies, innovation and consumer benefits likely to result from the Commission’s proposed Citizen’s Broadband Radio Service.
Concerning Contained Access Users (“CAUs”), the record demonstrates uniform opposition to authorizing a CAU to reserve exclusive use of GAA spectrum. Although our groups are sympathetic to meeting the perceived needs of certain “mission critical” public safety and other public entities for indoor quality of service, PISC suggests that exclusive-use reservations for CAUs should properly be Priority Access Licenses that do not diminish the GAA spectrum available to the public at large.
With respect to exclusion zones to protect incumbent naval radars, PISC agrees with the widespread consensus among commenters that the Commission must act as an independent regulatory agency and reject large and static “exclusion zones” that are not absolutely necessary to protect Federal incumbent operations from harmful interference, as well as any claims that private sector PA or GAA devices must be involuntarily protected from Federal incumbent transmissions. Static geographic exclusion zones are neither necessary nor spectrum efficient, and PISC urges the Commission to work with the White House and the NTIA to convert the flawed “Fast Track” exclusion zones into de minimis Coordination Zones.
Concerning PA licensing areas, although PISC agrees that census tracts could represent a workable “middle ground” compromise, PISC believes that the SAS can define PA licensing areas that better match the operational and protection contours of a wide variety of potential users by using a grid of standardized but small geographic “pixels,” as the Commission describes as an alternative approach. Our groups agree that fine-grained pixels can be combined to approximate the operational and protection contours of more heterogenous system deployments.
PISC strongly opposes package bidding for auctions in this band. Package bidding could completely negate the benefits of small licensing areas – a problem that would be exacerbated by the Commission’s proposal to allow entities to acquire as much as 30 MHz of PAL spectrum and to lock it up for five years. For similar reasons, PISC continues to recommend that when mutual exclusivity exists, a single entity (or any related entities) should be eligible to license no more than 20 MHz at any one time in a given license area.
Concerning the role of the SAS, PISC joins the strong support among commenters in favor of the Commission’s proposal to authorize the SAS to dynamically assign channels to PA licensees and variable amounts of bandwidth to GAA users, depending on demand and other factors. PISC strongly supports the Commission’s proposal to ensure that the SASs retain information on all operations within the 3.5 GHz band, including all the data pertaining to Section 96.36, and to make that information publicly available. Our groups believe it is critical for the credibility and proper functioning of the CBRS that the informational inputs and outputs of each SAS be completely transparent to the public. PISC also agrees with commenters seeking to clarify that consumers are not required to register end-user devices with the SAS if the devices are controlled by base stations or networks that do register and interact with the SAS.
With respect to technical rules, PISC joins the many commenters supporting the Commission’s effort to adopt common technical rules for PAL and GAA devices that promote both dynamic frequency assignment and a mass market ecosystem of devices that can operate on either licensed (PAL) or unlicensed (GAA) spectrum. PISC urges the Commission to adopt higher power levels in rural areas that are consistent with the existing 3650-3700 MHz Part 90 limits. If the Commission concludes this will preempt small cell GAA use in rural areas, our groups believe it would be preferable to apply the reduced end-user power levels to a portion of the GAA spectrum in rural areas, rather than render the entire 3550-3650 MHz band less potent for fixed wireless broadband services in less densely populated areas.
Finally, PISC is pleased to agree with the vast majority of comments filed in support of the Commission’s proposal to extend the proposed CBRS regulatory regime to the 3650-3700 MHz band, subject to a fair but finite transition period for incumbent providers who have deployed pursuant to the current Part 90 “light licensing” rules. To protect the investments made in reliance on the current Part 90 rules, as well as consumers relying on WISP services, PISC suggests that the five-year transition period could be extended to commence on the date that the first SAS is certified by the Commission for nationwide operation.
